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Ever since the Great Depression of the 1930s drew to a close, inﬂation
has been one of the major headaches for ﬁnancial and economic decision-
makers. Inﬂation and the unemployment rate have been the two major el-
ements that make up the misery index, while deﬂation has never seriously
been considered a threat. However, by the end of the 1990s, Japan, China,
and Hong Kong had been exhibiting a phenomenon of price decreases for
many years running, and the rate of price increases in both European and
American countries had also started to slow down. The issue of deﬂation
therefore gradually drew the attention of economists and policymakers.
The November 2002 issue of The Economist even went so far as to suggest
that deﬂation had become a serious threat to the global economy.
In Taiwan the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂator decreased in four
out of ﬁve years from 1999 to 2003, with the exception being 2001. The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) also declined in each of the years from 2001
to 2003. Rogoﬀ, chief economist of the International Monetary Fund,
published a research report in April 2003 in which Taiwan, together with
Japan, Hong Kong, and Germany, was ranked as a high-risk country for
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March 2005.deﬂation. The core CPI, published by the Directorate-General of Budget,
Accounting, and Statistics of the Executive Yuan in Taiwan, exhibited a
negative growth rate in each quarter in 2003. These ﬁndings have made de-
ﬂation a cause for concern among both scholars and the media. Although
the Central Bank of China in Taiwan has never admitted that Taiwan is
suﬀering from a deﬂation problem, it has tried very hard to promote do-
mestic economic activity and avoid price decreases.
Several international research institutions have engaged in research on
deﬂation; see, for instance Ahearne et al. (2002) and Rogoﬀ (2003). The
Bank of Japan (2001) also convened a symposium on the issue—The Role
of Monetary Policy under Low Inﬂation: Deﬂation Shocks and Policy Re-
sponses—in 2000, where participating scholars emphasized the impor-
tance of monetary policy in guarding against and dealing with deﬂation.1
In Taiwan, however, there have been no government reports on the do-
mestic deﬂation issue, probably for the reason that the government has
denied that the problem exists. Similarly, very few studies have been per-
formed by domestic scholars. Research reports compiled by the Depart-
ment of Economic Research of the Central Bank of China (2002) and the
Council for Economic Planning and Development of the Executive Yuan
(2003) have merely tried to explain the causes of and responsive strategies
to deﬂation in the light of other countries’ experiences. Wu (2003), for in-
stance, not only analyzed the reasons why the global price growth had
slowed since 1997, but he also discussed the causes of low prices in Taiwan.
Huang (2003) probed long-, medium-, and short-term causes that led to
the price decreases in Taiwan and provided policy recommendations.
However, although Wu and Huang talked about the causes of Taiwan’s de-
ﬂation, they simply presented narrative explanations or arguments, with-
out engaging in any in-depth or detailed analysis.
In the early part of 2004, Taiwan’s CPI reversed its downward trend and
started to rise. Although the problem of deﬂation in Taiwan disappears
gradually, there are several questions that are worth looking into. How se-
rious has the deﬂation problem in Taiwan really been in the last few years?
What are the fundamental reasons for the deﬂation? How has the Central
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1. The theme of the seminar held by the Bank of Japan (2001) was Monetary Policy under a
Low Inﬂation Rate, in which participants mostly emphasized the importance of monetary
policy during a period of deﬂation. For example, Cargill thought that central banks generally
focused more on policies to control the monetary environment during periods of inﬂation,
while neglecting the seriousness of the problem of deﬂation, and therefore seldom utilizing
monetary-policy tools to prevent the deﬂation phenomenon. This is considered to be one of
the main reasons for the Great Depression of the 1930s. Cargill thought that Sweden diﬀered
from the United States in that it laid emphasis on the price level, paying close attention to de-
ﬂation. As for Japan, he oﬀered the same suggestion, calling for an emphasis on the impor-
tance of monetary policy during a period of deﬂation. Goodfriend also thought that mone-
tary policy was the fundamental reason for deﬂation and economic stagnation.Bank in Taiwan responded to deﬂation? How eﬀective have the Central
Bank’s policies been? This chapter aims to answer these questions.
Since deﬂation is usually accompanied by a recession, section 10.2 of
this chapter brieﬂy introduces the changes in the political and economic
environment in Taiwan that have taken place in recent years, thereby pro-
viding the background for Taiwan’s unsatisfactory economic performance
since 1999. Section 10.3 explains two phenomena associated with macro-
price changes. One is deﬂation and the other is price divergence. Price
divergence refers to the phenomenon that the three macro-price indexes—
i.e., the CPI, wholesale price index (WPI), and GDP deﬂator (PGDP)—
have been moving in diﬀerent directions. In section 10.4, major global fac-
tors that have aﬀected Taiwan’s prices are emphasized. Section 10.5 probes
the key factors causing Taiwan’s PGDP to drop since 1999. The sources of
the WPI-CPI divergence are also identiﬁed. Section 10.6 explains how Tai-
wan’s Central Bank operates its monetary and exchange rate policies, and
then discusses its policy responses to deﬂation, while also carefully review-
ing their eﬀectiveness. The ﬁnal section presents the conclusions.
10.2 The Political and Economic Environment in Recent Years
Taiwan’s economic growth used to be regarded by foreign scholars and
decisionmakers as a “miracle” or taken as a “model” for developing coun-
tries to study or follow. Due to its sound economic fundamentals, quick
policy responses, and other reasons as mentioned in Shea and Shih (1999),
Taiwan was also relatively immune from the attack of the East Asian ﬁ-
nancial crisis in 1997–1998, performing better in terms of its economic
growth rate, unemployment rate, currency depreciation, and falling stock
prices than its East Asian neighbors.
As table 10.1 shows, however, Taiwan’s economic performance since
1999 has never returned to the illustrious growth of the past three to four
decades. The economic growth rate has yet to again exceed 6 percent, and
its ﬁrst negative growth rate of –2.18 percent in Taiwan’s post-war history
was recorded in 2001. The unemployment rate has also climbed steadily
and remained at a level of around 5 percent in 2003. Although the stock
price index and the total stock trading volume recovered a little in 2000,
they have both decreased in other years. The New Taiwan dollar (hereafter
the NT dollar) has also remained weak relative to the U.S. dollar during
this period.
There have been several factors that have served to bring about Taiwan’s
unsatisfactory economic performance since 1999. The poor performance
in 2001 can be partly explained by a gloomy world economy caused by the
bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles in late 2000 and the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in 2001. The SARS epidemic also hampered Taiwan’s economic






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.growth in 2003. In addition to these three well-known factors, the deterio-
ration in Taiwan’s political and economic environment also is a funda-
mental reason.
Since the early 1990s, the ruling power in Taiwan has gradually shifted
from those who migrated from mainland China to Taiwan in the late 1940s
together with the KMT (Kuomintang) government, over to the so-called
“native Taiwanese.” During the process of this power transition, an on-
going confrontation between the two camps has never been resolved. Al-
though a signiﬁcant proportion of the people in Taiwan would like to
maintain Taiwan’s status quo, there is a major division among the people
on the issue of whether Taiwan should pursue independence from China or
be uniﬁed with China at some point in the future. Constant friction be-
tween the two camps and disputes between them in major elections, which
Taiwan has held almost annually in recent years, have caused Taiwan to de-
generate into a society that lacks any consensus or harmony. The switch in
the ruling party from the KMT to the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party)
for the ﬁrst time in 2000 only further complicated the situation. KMT and
DPP legislators have since then fought tooth and nail almost irrationally
on any issue in the Legislative Yuan (the law-making body in Taiwan). The
result is a semiparalyzed government without much determination or ex-
ecutive power. This phenomenon of political unrest is certainly a negative
factor in relation to private investment.
The rise of China’s economy has also aﬀected Taiwan’s own economy in
many ways. China’s cheap labor and land have provided Taiwan’s fading
labor-intensive industries with an opportunity to revitalize. A big China
market has also been attractive to capital- and technology-intensive prod-
uct manufacturers. Therefore, huge numbers of business people ﬂooded
into China to invest in the 1990s. This massive investment in China gave
rise to concerns over whether Taiwan’s economy would be “hollowed out.”
This hollowing-out concern plus the bad feeling regarding China on its po-
litical stance of constantly repressing Taiwan in international aﬀairs ﬁnally
led former President Teng-Hui Lee to adopt a “no hurry, be patient” pol-
icy to guide economic relations with China. However, due to the huge po-
tential proﬁts from investing in China and the advantage of sharing the
same language and culture enjoyed by Taiwan businessmen in competing
with investors from other countries, this “no hurry, be patient” policy did
not eﬀectively counter the huge ﬂow of westward-bound investment from
Taiwan to China.
After the opposition DPP candidate won the presidential election in
2000, the DPP’s stance of leaning toward Taiwan’s independence from
China enhanced China’s hostility toward Taiwan. No oﬃcial dialogue be-
tween the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has ever been resumed. China has
even strengthened its threat of military reprisals against Taiwan. A large
number of the DPP’s loyal supporters also oppose any closer economic ties
Deﬂation and Monetary Policy in Taiwan 375with China. Tension with China of this sort has not only nearly put an end
to the potential role that Taiwan can play as a medium or bridge for foreign
investors entering the China market, but it has also discouraged private
and direct foreign investment in Taiwan.
The ﬁnancial sector in Taiwan has also encountered a number of prob-
lems. Allowing new private banks to be set up in 1991 suddenly increased
the number of domestic commercial banks from seventeen in 1991 to
thirty-three in 1993. Some credit cooperatives and investment and trust
companies were also allowed to be converted into commercial banks in
subsequent years. Therefore, the total number of domestic banks, includ-
ing commercial banks and medium-business banks, increased from
twenty-ﬁve in 1991 to forty-one in 1993 and to ﬁfty-two in 1999—more
than double the original number. The resulting ﬁerce competition among
banks led to credit expansion and prosperous stock and real estate markets
in the mid-1990s.
In the years that followed, although Taiwan remained relatively insu-
lated from the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the contagion eﬀects of the crisis
still caused Taiwan’s stock and real estate prices to fall and the nonper-
forming loans ratio of its ﬁnancial institutions to rise in 1998. Further-
more, between the end of 1998 and early-1999, several listed companies
and business groups, which had been found guilty of misconduct in fund
management (e.g., engaging in cross-investments in the stocks of their
group members, being highly leveraged, borrowing short to invest long, be-
ing involved in stock-price supporting activities, or overinvesting in the
slackening housing industry), sank into heavy ﬁnancial troubles. These 
so-called “land-mine” companies or business groups not only adversely
aﬀected the ﬁnancial condition of the domestic banks, but also accelerated
the downturn in stock prices.
Fierce competition among banks together with the accidents caused by
these “land-mine” companies steadily lowered the return on assets (ROA)
and the return on equity (ROE) of domestic banks, and raised the nonper-
forming loans ratios of ﬁnancial institutions during the 1998–2002 period,
as table 10.1 indicates. The willingness and ability of ﬁnancial institutions to
grant loans to the business sector therefore shrank during this same period.
All of the above-mentioned factors, including political unrest, tensions
with China, out-bound investments attracted by China, and a weakened ﬁ-
nancial sector, had a detrimental impact on private and foreign investment
in Taiwan. As shown in table 10.1, the growth of ﬁxed investment on the
part of private enterprises slowed down or even turned negative, while di-
rect investment abroad grew signiﬁcantly after 1999.
When faced with deﬂationary pressure, the government is usually ex-
pected to adopt an expansionary ﬁscal policy to stimulate the economy.
Unfortunately, Taiwan’s government has been constrained by its deterio-
rating ﬁnancial condition, such that it has not been able to aﬀord to expand
376 Ya-Hwei Yang and Jia-Dong Sheapublic expenditure. Under China’s threat of military action, Taiwan has
had no room to cut its national defense expenditure. Moreover, political
parties have been competing for votes by writing checks for welfare pro-
grams, cutting tax rates, and by providing tax holidays or tax exemptions
to please the voters. As a result, the tax burden in Taiwan, as table 10.1
shows, has fallen year after year to reach a level of 12.2 percent in 2003, one
of the lowest in the world. Outstanding central government debts as a per-
centage of gross national product (GNP) have also been increasing very
rapidly from 14.5 percent in 1999 to 31.3 percent in 2003.
Due to such ﬁnancial constraints, Taiwan’s public expenditure (includ-
ing government consumption, government investment, and public-
enterprise investment) in fact fell during 1999–2003, bringing a negative
contribution to economic growth in this period, as table 10.2 shows. We
can also see from this table that the private sector’s ﬁxed investment in ad-
dition contributed little or even negatively to economic growth, except in
the year 2000. Another conclusion we can draw from table 10.2 is that the
major driving force behind economic growth on the expenditure side dur-
ing the period 1999–2003 was net exports instead of domestic demand.
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Table 10.2 Contribution to the economic growth rate of expenditure itemsa (%)
Domestic demand
Economic Private
growth Private Public sector ﬁxed Increase in Net
Year rate Subtotal consumption expenditureb investment inventory exports
1996 6.10 5.58 3.85 0.87 0.46 0.40 0.52
(91.48) (8.52)
1997 6.68 8.43 4.30 0.75 2.48 0.90 –1.75
(126.20) (–26.20)
1998 4.57 6.38 3.88 0.70 1.75 0.05 –1.81
(139.61) (–39.61)
1999 5.42 1.87 3.25 –0.38 –0.11 –0.89 3.55
(34.50) (65.50)
2000 5.86 3.89 2.98 –0.28 2.36 –1.17 1.97
(66.40) (33.60)
2001 –2.18 –4.93 0.62 –0.26 –4.78 –0.51 2.75
(272.02) (–126.15)
2002 3.59 0.96 1.23 –0.73 0.30 0.16 2.63
(26.74) (73.26)
2003 3.31 0.36 0.42 –0.07 –0.17 0.18 2.95
(10.88) (89.12)
Source: DGBAS.
Note: Figures in parentheses are contribution shares to the economic growth rate of that speciﬁc year.
aCalculated by real growth rate of expenditure item x share in GDP of previous year.
bPublic expenditure includes government consumption, government investment, and public-enterprise
investment.10.3 Macro-price Changes in Taiwan
10.3.1 Deﬂation as a New but Short-term Concern
In April 2003 Taiwan was listed by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) as a country that faced a high risk of deﬂation, along with Japan,
Hong Kong, and Germany. The IMF calculated the deﬂation risk index for
thirty-ﬁve countries, and classiﬁed the results into four categories as high-,
medium-, low-, and very low-risk countries. Among the countries catego-
rized as being high-risk, Japan scored the highest, followed by Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Germany.2
Figure 10.1depicts the inﬂation rate of Taiwan’s GDP deﬂator (hereafter
PGDP) from 1961 to 2003. Except for 1965 when its value was slightly neg-
ative (–0.61 percent), the PGDP annual changes before 1998 were positive.
During this period, the annual inﬂation rate measured by PGDP seldom
exceeded 5 percent, except for the two oil crisis years. However, there has
been an obvious change since 1999. That is, PGDP inﬂation turned nega-
tive in most of the subsequent years. The annual PGDP change was –1.42
percent in 1999, –1.73 percent in 2000, 0.57 percent in 2001, –1.01 percent
in 2002, and –2.13 percent in 2003. The CPI also exhibited a negative in-
ﬂation rate for three consecutive years in 2001–2003, as shown in table 10.1.
The IMF and scholars in Taiwan thus became worried that Taiwan might
have started to experience deﬂation.3
Since 2003, however, the global as well as domestic economic situation
has improved. Starting with the second half of 2003, the global prices of
raw materials like steel, cement, petroleum, coal, wheat, soybeans, butter,
and paper pulp have been surging. During the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, the CPI
in Taiwan increased by 0.51 percent as compared with the same quarter in
2003. During that same time, the core CPI rose by 0.12 percent and the
WPI increased by 2.37 percent. The government and various research in-
stitutions in Taiwan have each forecasted that both the CPI and WPI will
exhibit positive growth rates in 2004. Taiwan’s period of deﬂation is there-
fore generally believed to be over.
10.3.2 Divergence of PGDP, CPI, and WPI
In recent years, the macro-price indexes in Taiwan have exhibited a di-
vergence, with the PGDP, CPI, and WPI moving in diﬀerent directions. As
ﬁgure 10.2 indicates, from 1999 to 2000 the PGDP declined, but the WPI
and CPI rose slightly. In addition, from 2002 to 2003 both the PGDP and
CPI declined, leading to a concern about deﬂation. The WPI, however,
rose—an obvious price divergence. When there is price divergence, which
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2. See Kumar (2003) and Rogoﬀ (2003).
3. Deﬂation is deﬁned as a phenomenon where general price levels continue to drop. To fa-
cilitate the analysis, the IMF deﬁnes deﬂation as occurring when annual price growth is neg-
ative for two consecutive years. Please see IMF (1999, 106).Deﬂation and Monetary Policy in Taiwan 379
Fig. 10.1 Growth rate of PGDP
Source: DGBAS.
Fig. 10.2 Inﬂation rates of WPI, CPI, PGDP
Source: Price Statistics Monthly, DGBAS.
price index is a proper indicator for inﬂation or deﬂation becomes an issue.
This paper chooses PGDP as the indicator in the discussion on deﬂation.
In fact, divergence of price indexes happens all the time in Taiwan. As
can be seen from table 10.3and ﬁgure 10.3, ever since 1982 price divergence
has occurred many times. For example, from 1986 to 1992, the CPI and
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.10.4 Global Factors Aﬀecting Taiwan Prices
The deterioration in Taiwan’s political and economic environment, as
mentioned in section 10.2, has not only brought about an unsatisfactory
performance in terms of economic growth in Taiwan, but also has formed
deﬂationary pressure on Taiwan’s macro prices. In addition, there have
been several global factors aﬀecting Taiwan’s macroeconomy and prices.
Taiwan is a highly open economy. Ever since the 1970s, the ratios of ex-
ports and imports to GDP have almost always remained above 40 percent,
sometimes even exceeding 50 percent. The macroeconomy of Taiwan has
thus been deeply aﬀected by the global economic situation and prices. For
example, during the periods of the two oil crises, Taiwan encountered the
problem of so-called “imported inﬂation.” Macro-price changes in Taiwan
in recent years have not only been caused by domestic factors, but have
also been closely related to major factors that have aﬀected global prices,
especially the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000 and the rise of China’s
economy.
Excessively optimistic expectations on the future of the internet, com-
munications, and the IT industries resulted in overinvestment and caused
stock prices to soar globally in the late-1990s. After the economic bubble
burst at the end of 2000, the huge excess capacities of these industries led to
their prices dropping. The bursting of the bubble also caused stock prices to
sink and wealth to shrink. Furthermore, the global economic situation
worsened and unemployment rose. All of these factors caused world con-
sumption to fall. In addition, excess capacity contributed to a pessimistic
outlook, such that willingness to invest decreased. Therefore, the bursting
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Fig. 10.3 Inﬂation rate of WPI, CPI and PGDP (annual)
Source: Price Statistics Monthly, DGBAS.of the Internet and IT bubbles brought about a weakening in world con-
sumption and investment, which further caused global prices to fall.
As an economy highly dependent on exports, especially the exports of
products from IT and IT-related industries, Taiwan suﬀered heavily from
the bursting of the IT bubble. Taiwan’s total exports dropped by 17.16 per-
cent in 2001, which was also one of the major factors causing a negative
economic growth rate of –2.18 percent in that year for Taiwan.
Ever since China accelerated its transition from a controlled economy to
a market economy in 1992 and reinforced its trade and investment rela-
tions with the rest of the world, it has had a signiﬁcant impact on the global
economy. The rise of China’s economy has aﬀected global and Taiwanese
prices in several ways.
China has a huge pool of cheap labor. Labor-intensive products pro-
duced in China and exported to the world market have forced the global
prices of those products, mostly ﬁnal consumer goods, to fall. On the other
hand, the rise of China has caused the prices of China’s major imports,
mostly raw materials, agricultural products, and capital- or technology-
intensive goods (regarding which, China has a comparative disadvantage)
to rise. China’s rapid economic development has also raised the purchas-
ing power and hence private consumption of the Chinese people, which has
further increased the demand for and the global prices of raw materials and
agricultural products. To prepare for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing
and the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition, China has begun large-scale
public-construction projects, which have given rise to even higher increases
in the global prices of raw materials such as minerals, cement, and petro-
leum.4
In sum, due to the rise of China’s economy, the global prices of its ex-
ports (most are manufactured as ﬁnal consumer goods) have been de-
creasing, while the prices of its imports (mainly upstream raw materials,
agricultural products, and machinery and equipment) have been rising.
The prices of related products in Taiwan are naturally aﬀected.
As table 10.4 indicates, export prices and import prices in Taiwan had
been moving in diﬀerent directions each year in 2000–2003. The general in-
dex of export prices, together with its major component—the export prices
of industrial goods—had been decreasing almost steadily except for in
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4. China consumed approximately 50 percent of the world’s cement, 36 percent of its steel
products, and 30 percent of its coal in 2003. In 2003, China’s demand for steel products
amounted to about 38 million tons. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, China imported 10.08 million
tons of steel products worth U.S.$5.72 billion. The quantity of steel products imported in-
creased by 17.5 percent compared with the ﬁrst quarter of 2003, with the total value going up
by 28.4 percent. In 2003, China imported 91.12 million tons of crude oil (representing annual
growth of 30 percent). In the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, China imported 30.14 million tons of crude
oil worth U.S.$7.15 billion. The volume of crude oil imports increased by 35.7 percent com-
pared with the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 and its total value increased by 41.2 percent. This shows
that unit prices for steel products and crude oil have surged.2001. On the other hand, the general index of import prices, especially the
import prices of raw materials, which account for 70.0 percent of the gen-
eral import price index in weighting, had been rising, with an exception in
2001. These changes in export and import prices were consistent with the im-
pacts of the bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles and the rise of China’s
economy on the world prices.
10.5 Causes of Deﬂation and Price Divergence
10.5.1 Analysis of PGDP Deﬂation
The GDP deﬂator (PGDP) measures the price of ﬁnal domestic prod-
ucts. In order to explain the change of PGDP, we need a theoretical model
as the base. According to the aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply
(AD-AS) model, any factor that may cause the AD curve to move to the
right (left) will lead PGDP to go up (down); while it may cause the AS
curve to shift to the right (left), leading PGDP to go down (up).
We can set up the AD equation as the following:
            
(1) Y   AD(PGDP; GEXP, MS, Pf, Yf, EXR, Z ...).
In this AD equation, Y is real GDP; GEXP is government real expendi-
tures, including government consumption expenditures, government in-
vestment, and public enterprise investment; MS is money-supply volume;
Pf and Yf represent foreign export prices and the global economic situa-
tion, respectively; and EXR is the exchange rate measuring the value of the
U.S. dollar in terms of the NT dollar. Z represents unquantiﬁable qualita-
tive factors, including political unrest, tensions with China, and a weak-
Deﬂation and Monetary Policy in Taiwan 383






General Agricultural agricultural Industrial General Raw Capital Consumer
Year index goods goods goods index materials goods goods
1998 5.57 40.41 9.24 5.53 0.74 –1.81 6.55 11.21
1999 –8.53 4.93 10.50 –8.93 –4.10 –4.75 –3.72 –0.92
2000 –0.88 –51.18 –18.11 –0.34 4.63 7.15 –4.53 –0.15
2001 0.32 –6.31 –10.14 0.53 –1.25 –2.21 0.15 2.85
2002 –1.49 16.22 1.11 –1.55 0.40 0.88 –1.58 –0.45
2003 –1.49 10.10 4.45 –1.62 5.14 7.00 –0.25 1.35
Source: Price Statistics Monthly, DGBAS.ened ﬁnancial sector. On the right-hand side of the equation, a positive or
negative symbol above each explanatory variable represents the direction
of impact of that variable on Y.
A general equation of aggregate-supply (AS) can be presented as fol-
lows:
      
(2) Y   AS(PGDP; W, K, T).
In this equation, W is the nominal wage rate; K is the capital stock; and
T is the technology level. Because it is diﬃcult to measure the capital stock
K and technology level T, and because W, K, and T may jointly aﬀect ag-
gregate supply through unit output labor cost LC, the AS function can be
rewritten as
  
(3) Y   AS∗ (PGDP; LC).5
From equations (1) and (3), the PGDP equation can be derived as
            
(4) PGDP   f(GEXP, MS, EXR, Pf, Yf, LC, Z ...).
Because increases in the ﬁrst ﬁve explanatory variables on the right-hand
side all cause the AD curve to shift to the right, and a rise in LC causes the
AS curve to shift to the left, thus all six explanatory variables have a posi-
tive impact on PGDP.6 However, Z has negative inﬂuence on PGDP.
Since the ﬁrst six variables are measurable, we can look at their trends to
help identify the sources of PGDP deﬂation in Taiwan. Since 1999, PGDP
has been declining, except in 2001. This phenomenon of a declining PGDP
has been caused by several factors. Figure 10.4shows the changes in four ex-
planatory variables (GEXP, LC, EXR, and Pf) which have contributed to
PGDP deﬂation. As explained in section 10.2, mainly due to a ﬁnance con-
straint, government expenditures (GEXP) decreased during this period.
Furthermore, improvements in production technology caused unit output
labor costs (LC) to go down, except in 2001. The bursting of the Internet
and IT bubbles and the rise of China’s economy also depressed world export
prices (Pf) before 2003. Furthermore, the NT dollar appreciated relative to
the U.S. dollar in 1999 and 2000. All of these factors contributed to PGDP’s
decline.
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5. In theory, it is not diﬃcult to infer that the impact of the wage rate W on unit output la-
bor cost LC is positive, and the impact of the capital stock K and the technology level T on
LC is negative. Furthermore, because LC aﬀects aggregate supply negatively, equation 3 im-
plies that the impact of W on Y is negative, and the impact of K and T on Y is positive, which
is consistent with equation 2.
6. We have tried to apply the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) technique to estimate this
equation. The empirical results support our theoretical model.10.5.2 Causes of WPI-CPI Divergence
This subsection intends to explain the possible factors that caused a di-
vergence between the WPI and CPI during the period extending from the
fourth quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2003. During this period, the
CPI slowly declined, while the WPI rose.
What the WPI measures is factory prices or wholesale prices of three
categories of products: domestically-produced and domestically-sold
(DPDS) products, imported goods, and exported goods. It is a weighted
average of the above three categories of price indexes. Let WPId, PM, and
PX represent the price index of DPDS products, the import price index,
and the export price index, respectively. These three components enjoy
roughly equal weights in the current calculation of the WPI in Taiwan.
As ﬁgure 10.5 shows, the WPId in Taiwan fell during 1998 and 1999, be-
gan to rise slightly in 2000, and followed up with a further slight decline in
2001. Since then, the WPId has been rising. The reason why the WPId fell
in 2001 was the recession in Taiwan. A lack of eﬀective domestic demand
caused the WPId to slide. Since 2003, the economy has slightly recovered.
Domestic demand and the WPId are therefore rising.
In the case of import prices (PM), because agricultural products and in-
dustrial raw materials constitute the largest portion of Taiwan’s imports,
followed by capital goods and consumer goods, PM is mainly aﬀected by
the global prices of agricultural products and industrial raw materials as
well as capital goods. It is also inﬂuenced by the global prices of consumer
goods, the NT-dollar exchange rate, and customs duties. Since the 1980s,
the eﬀective customs-duty rate has decreased, resulting in decreasing im-
port prices. Since 2001, however, the NT dollar has depreciated, pushing
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Fig. 10.4 Changes in PGDP and its determinants (annual growth rate)
Source: DGBAS.up import prices. Strong Chinese demand for raw materials and capital
goods has caused the global prices of that category of goods to soar, thus
raising Taiwan’s import prices and hence the WPI since the fourth quarter
of 2002.
As for export prices (PX), Taiwan’s exports are mainly composed of in-
dustrial products, the bulk of which are information industry and electrical
machinery or electronics products. The former has been aﬀected by the burst-
ing of the Internet bubble, and the latter by competition from China’s exports
in recent years. The PX has thus dropped since the second half of 2002.
Figure 10.5 summarizes the trend in the WPI and its components since
1998. During the period from the fourth quarter of 2002 to the third quar-
ter of 2003, the WPI rose. Among its components, the wholesale price in-
dex for DPDS products (WPId) rose as well as the import price index (PM),
while the export price index (PX) declined. Therefore, it is evident that the
rise in the WPI was mainly caused by a rise in the prices of DPDS products
and imported goods.
CPI trends have diﬀered from those of the WPI. From the fourth quar-
ter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2003, the WPI surged, while the CPI fell.
The CPI measures the retail prices of consumer goods and services. Con-
sumer goods can be further divided into local consumer goods and im-
ported consumer goods.7 In other words, CPI measures the price of local
consumer goods, imported consumer goods, and service sectors. A fall in
the price of services (Ps) accounts for a large portion of a decline in CPI.
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Fig. 10.5 Change in WPI and its component (annual growth rate)
Source: Price Statistics Monthly, DGBAS.
7. Since there is no other better proxy, we adopt PGDP as the proxy measure of the prices
of local consumer goods. We have tried some regression of CPI on PGDP, PMc, and Ps, and
obtained satisfactory results.Because the fall in the price of services (Ps) is a major factor causing the
CPI to drop, we study the reasons for the decrease in Ps. The production
costs and prices of services are mainly determined by the wage (W), rent
(R), and the interest rate (r). Figure 10.6 indicates that Ps moves closely
with rent R and the interest rate r. The wage has also been relatively stable
since 2001.
Falling rents were mainly caused by factors such as weak domestic de-
mand, the outward migration of companies and white-collar laborers, and
an oversupply of houses and oﬃce buildings. The decline in the interest
rate was due to the central banks of many countries adopting a low-
interest-rate policy to stimulate their economies during this period, a path
that Taiwan also followed. Stable wages were the result of competition
from Chinese labor and an increase in domestic unemployment.
10.6 The Central Bank’s Policy Responses to Deﬂation
Although the Central Bank in Taiwan (formally the Central Bank of
China, hereafter the CBC) has never admitted that Taiwan has encoun-
tered the problem of deﬂation, the CBC implemented some measures to
stimulate aggregate demand for Taiwan’s products, in order to promote
economic growth as well as to counter the problem of deﬂation.8 The dete-
rioration in the government’s ﬁnancial situation as explained in section
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Fig. 10.6 Changes in Ps and its components (annual growth rate)
Source: Statistical Database, DGBAS.
Note: Rent is housing rentals. Wage is per capita average salary of employees each month.
8. When deﬂation became a public concern in Taiwan in 2002 and 2003, the CBC several
times tried to downplay the issue by pointing out either that the core CPI was still rising or
that the falling CPI was just a temporary phenomenon.10.2 restricted the government’s ability to adopt an expansionary ﬁscal
policy to promote the economy. The CBC’s monetary and exchange rate
policies therefore became the major policy instruments for the government
to rely on.
10.6.1 The Formation of Monetary Policy
According to the Central Bank Act, the CBC has the obligation to main-
tain price as well as exchange rate stability and to assist in economic devel-
opment. To achieve these ﬁnal goals, the CBC chooses monetary-aggregate
targeting as the basic framework of its monetary policy, instead of inﬂa-
tion, exchange-rate, or interest-rate targeting. Since 1992, the monetary
aggregate M2 has been chosen as the intermediate target of monetary pol-
icy to achieve the ﬁnal goals.
Before the end of each year, the CBC (often after having consulted with
scholars and experts) sets and publicly announces the target zone of the
M2 growth rate for the subsequent year based on the government’s target
ﬁgures of the economic growth rate and inﬂation rate, as well as other fac-
tors inﬂuencing the demand for money, such as the opportunity cost of
holding money and the diversiﬁcation of ﬁnancial assets. Using a zone,
rather than a speciﬁc number, as the M2 growth target, the CBC is en-
dowed with the ﬂexibility to maintain the stability of interest rates, the ex-
change rate, and other major ﬁnancial indicators throughout the year.
The actual M2 growth rate is very carefully observed each month by the
CBC. In order to eﬀectively control M2, the CBC adopts reserve money as
the operational target. At the beginning of each month, the CBC has a
monetary estimation and forecasting meeting to determine the target value
of reserve money for that month. A reference target for the inter-bank
overnight call-loan rate is also derived in the meeting. The CBC then applies
a variety of operational instruments, including required reserves, discounts
and accommodations, open market operations, re-deposits from ﬁnancial
institutions, selective credit management, and moral suasion, to ﬁne-tune
the daily ﬁgures of reserve money and the inter-bank overnight call-loan
rate.
Since monetary-aggregate targeting is generally regarded as outdated,
the CBC occasionally has faced challenges from scholars who strongly sug-
gest to replace monetary-aggregate targeting with interest-rate targeting or
inﬂation targeting. By adopting a target zone for M2 growth and setting a
reference target for the inter-bank overnight call-loan rate in its opera-
tions, the CBC in fact has implicitly incorporated interest-rate targeting in
its framework of monetary policy.
Among CBC’s operational instruments, open market operations are the
most frequently-used instruments. Re-deposits from ﬁnancial instruments,
selective credit management, and adjusting the discount and accommoda-
tion rates are sometimes adopted. The required-reserve ratios are adjusted
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For open market operations, before 1992 the CBC relied on the issuance of
savings bonds, treasury bills, and certiﬁcates of deposit (CDs) as tools to
manage the liquidity situation in the ﬁnancial market. However, the is-
suance of savings bonds and treasury bills was terminated in 1992 and
1998, respectively. In recent years, the CBC has either issued or redeemed
CDs almost every day to aﬀect the liquidity and inter-bank overnight call-
loan rate. Since 1999, the CBC has depended heavily on the issuance of
CDs and on receiving re-deposits from ﬁnancial institutions in order to
sterilize the impact of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves on re-
serve money, such that the CBC’s outstanding CDs and re-deposits from
ﬁnancial institutions have increased very rapidly. As of the end of 2003, 
the outstanding CDs even reached NT$2.99 trillion, equivalent to 185 per-
cent of total reserve money, and re-deposits from ﬁnancial institutions
amounted to NT$2.06 trillion, or 127 percent of reserve money.9
10.6.2 Exchange Rate Policy
The authorities in Taiwan shifted from a ﬁxed exchange rate system to a
ﬂoating exchange rate system in July 1978. The purpose behind introduc-
ing a ﬂoating exchange rate was to make Taiwan’s economy less vulnerable
to external disturbances. However, in a highly open economy like Taiwan,
the exchange rate is a key factor aﬀecting its trade balance, economic
growth, and domestic price level. The exchange rate is therefore frequently
regarded as an important policy instrument to promote economic growth
or stabilize prices. According to the Central Bank Act, the CBC also has
the obligation to stabilize the external value of the NT dollar, as in the ex-
change rate. Hence, since the adoption of a ﬂoating exchange rate in 1978,
the CBC has frequently intervened in the foreign exchange market in order
to aﬀect the level of the exchange rate or its ﬂuctuations. The ﬁnal purpose
of the CBC is either to promote exports and economic growth, to stabilize
domestic prices, or to stabilize the exchange rate. In other words, what is
adopted by the CBC is in fact a managed ﬂoating exchange rate.
The general impression and feeling derived by scholars and experts in
Taiwan over the CBC’s foreign exchange operations may be summed up as
follows. First, the CBC has usually adopted a strategy of repressing the NT
dollar, aiming to promote exports. Therefore, the NT dollar has been char-
acterized as being “easy to depreciate, diﬃcult to appreciate.” Second, when
domestic prices face any serious inﬂation problem, the CBC is then more
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9. Re-deposits from ﬁnancial institutions constitute a very powerful and eﬀective opera-
tional instrument for the CBC to adjust reserve money. The CBC is entitled to receive or re-
turn re-deposits from the postal savings system, three specialized agricultural banks, and
other approved banks when the CBC concludes that the domestic ﬁnancial situation requires
it to do so. To increase (decrease) reserve money, the CBC can simply return (receive) re-
deposits to (from) the ﬁnancial institutions.willing to allow the NT dollar to appreciate. Third, when major events such
as political unrest, a military threat from China, and the East Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis in 1997–1998 occurred, such that the NT dollar faced serious pres-
sure to depreciate, the CBC was obliged to defend the exchange rate.
Since the CBC has kept information on foreign exchange intervention a
secret, the impact of CBC’s intervention on the exchange rate is diﬃcult to
estimate. In a recent study on the NT-dollar exchange rate, Yang and Shea
(2005) set up an optimal-intervention model to introduce three variables,
representing three purposes of CBC intervention, into the determination
equation of the NT-dollar exchange rate, together with the standard fac-
tors aﬀecting the exchange rate, such as the relative price level, interest-rate
gap, and export-competing countries’ exchange rates. The empirical esti-
mation results of this paper show that each of the three intervention-
purpose variables played a signiﬁcant role in the determination of the NT-
dollar exchange rate. The model incorporating the intervention-purpose
variables performed far better, in terms of both explanatory power and
forecasting power, than the model that excluded the intervention-purpose
variables. These results clearly indicate that CBC’s intervention is really a
key factor aﬀecting the NT-dollar exchange rate, and that promoting eco-
nomic growth, stabilizing domestic prices, and stabilizing the exchange
rate are truly the main concerns of the CBC in exchange rate management.
10.6.3 Counter-Deﬂation Policies
By coping with the weakening demand for money caused by the slow-
down of economic growth and the increase of substituting ﬁnancial assets,
the CBC could not but passively and gradually adjust downward the target
zone of its M2 growth rate during the period from 2000 to 2003, as shown
in ﬁgure 10.7. This ﬁgure also shows that the actual growth rate of M2 fell
most of the time into the target zone, which indicates that the CBC’s man-
agement of money supply was, generally speaking, satisfactory during this
period.
The expansionary monetary policy adopted by the CBC to stimulate
domestic demand was revealed by the policy measures, which were in-
tended to loosen the monetary environment and to guide the market inter-
est rate in a downward direction. Between December 2000 and the end of
2003, the CBC lowered both the discount rate and the rate on accommo-
dations on ﬁfteen occasions, as indicated by table 10.5. In 2001–2003, the
required-reserve ratios of the NT-dollar deposits and foreign currency de-
posits were reduced on one occasion and three occasions, respectively. As
a result, the market interest rates as represented by the inter-bank over-
night call-loan rate, one-year time deposit rate, and the 31–90 day Com-
mercial Paper (CP) rate in the secondary market all moved downward in
2001–2003 as ﬁgure 10.8 shows.
As for its exchange rate policy, the CBC has been used to keeping the NT
dollar undervalued in ordinary times in order to stimulate Taiwan’s exports
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economic growth in the period 2000–2003, the CBC was naturally more
eager to intervene in the foreign exchange market than in any ordinary pe-
riod by purchasing foreign exchange in the market to maintain an under-
valued NT dollar or to prevent it from appreciating. Deﬂation in this pe-
riod further strengthened the justiﬁcation for the CBC’s foreign exchange
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Table 10.5 CBC interest rates (percent per annum)
Accommodations Accommodations
Effective date of change Discount with collateral without collateral
27 June 2000 4.750 5.125 9.625
29 Dec. 2000 4.625 5.000 9.625
2 Feb. 2001 4.375 4.750 9.625
6 Mar. 2001 4.250 4.625 9.625
30 Mar. 2001 4.125 4.500 9.625
23 Apr. 2001 4.000 4.375 9.625
18 May 2001 3.750 4.125 6.000
29 June 2001 3.500 3.875 5.750
20 Aug. 2001 3.250 3.625 5.500
19 Sep. 2001 2.750 3.125 5.000
4 Oct. 2001 2.500 2.875 4.750
8 Nov. 2001 2.250 2.625 4.500
28 Dec. 2001 2.125 2.500 4.375
28 June 2002 1.875 2.250 4.125
12 Nov. 2002 1.625 2.000 3.875
27 June 2003 1.375 1.750 3.625
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, CBC.
Fig. 10.7 Target zone and actual growth rate of M2
Source: The Central Bank of China.intervention. Without its intervention, the currency’s appreciation would
have caused domestic prices to go down, thereby worsening the deﬂation
problem. Therefore, the CBC’s foreign exchange intervention during this
period was regarded as a good strategy for “killing two birds with one
stone.” That is, an undervalued NT dollar was believed to be beneﬁcial
both in promoting economic growth and in combating deﬂation.10
The CBC intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market to slow
down the appreciation of the NT dollar during the period 2000–2003 when
Taiwan enjoyed a huge balance-of-payments surplus. Although the NT
dollar was still appreciating then, CBC tried to smooth its movement, oth-
erwise the degree of appreciation would have been larger. The result of the
CBC’s intervention was a rapid piling up of foreign exchange reserves and
a relatively stable NT-dollar exchange rate. The foreign exchange reserves
held by the CBC almost doubled from US$106.7 billion at the end of the
year 2000 to US$206.6 billion at the end of 2003. The NT$-U.S.$ exchange
rate even fell from 32.992 to 33.978, a depreciation of 2.90 percent relative
to the U.S. dollar, during the same period, when most of the currencies of
Taiwan’s major export-competing countries were appreciating.11
The by-product of foreign exchange purchasing by the CBC was a
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Fig. 10.8 Market interest rates
Source: Financial Statistic Monthly, CBC.
10. Svenson (2001) proposed depreciation as a foolproof way of getting out of deﬂation for
Japan. This policy recommendation was actually adopted by CBC.
11. During the same period from the end of the year 2000 to the end of 2003, the apprecia-
tion rates of the currencies of Taiwan’s major export-competing countries relative to the U.S.
dollar were as follows:
Japan South Korea Hong Kong Singapore Malaysia
7.01 percent 6.04 percent 0.51 percent 1.76 percent 0pumping out of reserve money into the ﬁnancial market. To control the
growth of M2 within the target zone, the CBC was obligated to issue CDs
and to receive re-deposits from ﬁnancial institutions so as to sterilize the
impact of foreign exchange intervention on reserve money. The CBC’s out-
standing CDs hence rapidly increased from NT$562 billion at the end of
the year 2000 to NT$2,992 billion at the end of 2003, and re-deposits from
ﬁnancial institutions nearly doubled from NT$1,148 billion to NT$2,056
billion over the same three-year period.
Although lowering the target zone of M2 growth rate was a passive re-
sponse to a weakened demand for money, and massive sterilization was a
necessary policy measure to control the money supply after heavy foreign
exchange interventions, these two measures may still seem as a contradic-
tion to the expansionary monetary policy that the CBC is supposed to
adopt. However, the falling of the market interest rates as shown in ﬁgure
10.8, together with the rising liquidity ratio of banks and the dropping of
the ratio of loans and investments over deposits of major ﬁnancial institu-
tions as reported in table 10.6, all show that CBC had eﬀectively created a
relatively loose monetary environment.12
Despite these eﬀorts, the CBC’s eﬀectiveness in curbing deﬂation and
stimulating economic growth might have been limited for several reasons.
First, political unrest and tensions with China had not eased, and these
were major factors weakening private consumption and domestic invest-
ment in Taiwan. Second, in view of its high degree of openness, Taiwan’s
economic performance was closely linked with that of the global economy.
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12. In addition, there are two measures about real estate market which contribute on the
counter-deﬂation policy. First, the preferential loans for real estate are adopted, which is sub-
sided by the Ministry of the Interior, and CBC provided the funds needed. Second, the Cen-
tral Bank advises local banks to adopt interest-index housing loans. The interest-indexed
housing loans are set according to the interest rates of one-year time deposits or time and
savings deposits plus ﬁxed markup. This policy makes the interest rate of real estate move
together with the market interest rate. As a result, the interest rates of real estate are trans-
parent, and it follows the decline of market interest rates. It can enhance the eﬀects of
transmitting monetary policy. These measures help lessen the interest burden of housing buy-
ers, stimulate the real estate market, and lessen the threat of deﬂation.
Table 10.6 Liquidity ratio and loan/deposits ratio (%)
Liquidity ratio of Ratios of loans and investments over







Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, CBC.Taiwan could hardly curb deﬂation caused by external factors. Third, due
to the restrictions imposed by the government’s deteriorating ﬁnancial sit-
uation, an expansionary ﬁscal policy could not be implemented. By de-
pending on the CBC’s policies alone, Taiwan’s economy could not have im-
proved very much. However, we may state that CBC’s eﬀorts might have at
least shielded the economy from a more serious recession and deﬂation in
2000–2003.
Of course, the CBC’s counter-deﬂation policies have not been immune
from complaints and criticisms. Although lowering the market interest
rates had been generally regarded as a necessary and correct policy direc-
tion, it created complaints from depositors, as well as from insurance com-
panies since it depressed their proﬁtability. Some scholars and journalists
even criticized that the CBC had intervened too heavily in the foreign ex-
change market on the basis that the foreign exchange reserves had accu-
mulated too rapidly and too much. Nevertheless, the CBC’s policy re-
sponses to deﬂation were in general well accepted by the general public and
most scholars in Taiwan.13
10.7 Conclusion
Taiwan is a small open economy that is characterized by an export-
oriented path of development. Domestic investment also serves to stimu-
late the growth of the economy. There have been some major changes in the
political and economic environment in Taiwan in recent years. These
changes—including political unrest, tensions with China, outbound in-
vestment to China, a weakened ﬁnancial system, and a deteriorating gov-
ernment ﬁnancial situation—have provided the backdrop for an economic
slowdown and deﬂation in Taiwan. Some global factors, especially the
bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles in late 2000 and the rise of China’s
economy, have also heavily inﬂuenced both global and Taiwanese prices.
This chapter probes the reasons inﬂuencing deﬂation during the period
from 1999 to 2003. Reviewing the actual changes of some major economic
variables aﬀecting the aggregate demand or the aggregate supply, this chap-
ter has identiﬁed some sources of PGDP deﬂation in Taiwan. During this
period, government expenditures have decreased. This factor together
with development of production technology that has caused unit output
labor costs to fall, the collapse of the bubble economy, the inﬂux of cheap
products from China into the world market, and the NT dollar’s apprecia-
tion have all contributed to a lower PGDP.
In order to ﬁght deﬂation, the Central Bank adopted several measures
to reduce the extent of price decreases. It lowered the discount rate and the
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13. Some reports of investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs (2004), Lehman Brothers
(2004), and UBS (2004), also have positive evaluation on the monetary policy of CBC in this
period.rate on accommodations on many occasions, and occasionally reduced the
required-reserve ratio to guide the market interest rates in a downward di-
rection. The Central Bank also intervened in the foreign exchange market
to maintain an undervalued NT dollar, so as to promote exports and com-
bat deﬂation at the same time.
Although the Central Bank tried to help solve the deﬂation problem, its
monetary policy could not serve as the only remedy. Various factors still
needed to be added to strengthen the recession situation. Therefore, the ex-
pansionary eﬀects of a loose monetary environment do not seem to be sig-
niﬁcant. Fortunately, from 2004, the Taiwan economy is no longer under
the threat of deﬂation.
During this period of deﬂation, the price conﬁguration has experienced
a change, whereby the PGDP has gone down and the CPI has slightly de-
creased, but the WPI has gone up. In fact, this kind of price-divergence
phenomenon has not only appeared during the period of deﬂation, but has
also appeared repeatedly on several occasions according to historical data
over the years.
In analyzing the reasons why the WPI and CPI trends have diverged
since 2002, we ﬁnd that the WPI increase is mainly due to the huge Chinese
demand for raw materials. This has caused the prices of global raw materi-
als and Taiwan’s imports to rise, which has caused the WPI to rise. Another
reason is that the domestic economy has been recovering since 2003. As for
the CPI decrease, this has resulted from a decrease in the prices of services
and PGDP. A decrease in the prices of services is related to the decline in
rents and the interest rate. A rise in domestic unemployment and competi-
tion from China’s cheap labor has also kept domestic wages steady.
The deﬂation problem puzzled Taiwanese scholars during the period
from 1999 to 2003. Fortunately, it has started to disappear gradually since
2004. The economic growth rate increased up to 5.71 percent, and inﬂation
rates for PGDP, WPI, and CPI are –1.8 percent, 7.1 percent, and 1.7 per-
cent in 2004, respectively. It shows the phenomenon of price divergence in
2004. Furthermore, although PGDP growth rate is negative in 2004, the
ﬁrst quarter of 2005 is around 0.3 percent, and it is expected to be positive
for all the year of 2005. Although deﬂation in Taiwan seems to be over, the
global and domestic factors will all continue to inﬂuence Taiwan’s econ-
omy from diﬀerent aspects.
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Summary of the Paper
The chapter by Yang and Shea gives a nice starting point for the analysis
of the deﬂation experience in Taiwan in the early 2000s. They oﬀer a broad
political and economic background for the deﬂation ﬁrst, and then a basic
analysis of the price movements, and the description of the monetary-
policy operation in the end. This comments focus mainly on the monetary-
policy operation.
The Monetary-Policy Operation
The framework for the Taiwanese monetary policy has been monetary
targeting for years but its operation has changed recently. The Central
Bank of Taiwan seems to have smoothed the interest rate changes recently,
as Young and Shea pointed out. The volatility of the interest rates got de-
creased evidently since around 1998 (ﬁg. 10C1.1). Though the operation
has become more pragmatic the monetary aggregate has been within the
target band, except for in the latter half of 2002. Thus, we may evaluate that
the Central Bank has maintained the monetary targeting well.1
However, the operation in 2002 is highly problematic. It is the time when
the Taiwanese economy faced the deﬂation. Though the WPI increased
slightly, both the CPI and the GDP deﬂator decreased. In addition, the
GDP gap2 is signiﬁcantly negative after the IT bubble collapsed. As ﬁgure
10C1.2 shows, these two main concerns for the monetary policy unani-
mously call for the monetary ease. But, the money supply did not even
meet the lower end of the target band.
This policy operation seems quite passive, even though the money de-
mand would have been quite stagnant then. In fact, the Central Bank low-
ered its discount rate only twice in 2002, from 2.125 to 1.875 in June, and
to 1.625 in November. The inter-bank rate followed it from around 2.30 in
January to 1.60 in December.
The Central Bank did have ample chances to meet the monetary target
in 2002, since it implemented massive FX market intervention against the
NT dollar appreciation. However, it sterilized this by the open market op-
eration and the re-deposit.
The Central Bank might have been in the “wait-and-see” mode, after the
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1. The Central Bank seems to have faced some diﬃculties so that it has changed the deﬁni-
tion of the target aggregates. That is common in the monetary-targeting countries.
2. The GDP gap in the chart is calculated as the deviation of the actual GDP from its quad-
ratic trend.aggressive easing in 2001; it lowered the discount rate eleven times from
4.625 to 2.125. But, later, it found it necessary to lower interest rates
through 2003. In addition, the literature had already shown that the ex-
traordinary aggressive easing is desirable on the edge of the deﬂation and
the zero bound of the nominal interest.
Based on these reasons, we could evaluate that the Central Bank’s easing
decisions were delayed in 2002. In fact, even the simple Taylor rule shows
that the inner-bank rate should have been lowered more (ﬁg. 10C1.3).3
The Analysis of the Deﬂation
Yang and Shea decomposed the factors aﬀecting the price movements in
Taiwan. Their main analysis is about the GDP deﬂator. They concluded
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Fig. 10C1.1 Taipei inter-bank overnight rate
3. The calculation is based on the original coeﬃcients of 0.5 and 0.5 and the target inﬂation
rate of 1.835 percent (the Taiwanese average inﬂation rate for 1982 to 2004).that the reduction in unit labor cost, lower export prices, the NT dollar ap-
preciation, and the low government expenditure are the main contributors
for the recent deﬂation. Then, they focused on the divergent behavior of
the price indexes, GDP deﬂator, CPI, and the WPI.
However, based on the discussion on the monetary operation, the focus
should be put on the persistence of the factors contributing for the deﬂa-
tion. By doing so, they might be able to examine the reasons why the Cen-
tral Bank downplayed the deﬂation in 2001–2003.
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Comment Shigenori Shiratsuka
Introduction
Ya-Hwei Yang and Jia-Dong Shea provide useful information on Tai-
wan’s experience with deﬂation in the early 2000s, ranging from political
and economic background to price developments and monetary-policy re-
sponses. This is another story of deﬂation in the East Asian region, but one
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Fig. 10C1.3 The Taylor rule and the actual rate: inter-bank overnight rate
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those of the BOJ or the IMES.less well-known compared with Japan’s experience in the years following
the mid-1990s.
As Toshiki Jinushi points out in his comments, Yang and Shea’s chapter
seems to suggest that deﬂation in Taiwan is inﬂuenced not only by tempo-
rary factors but also more persistent factors. This associates me with
Japan’s experience of low economic growth in the 1990s, often referred to
as the “lost decade.” Based on my previous papers, joint with co-authors,
on Japan’s experience, I will elaborate some possible explanations for de-
ﬂation in Taiwan involving structural and persistent factors.
Distortion in Cross-Sectional Resource Allocation
The ﬁrst point is that various structural impediments prevent the re-
sources in the economy from reallocating in an eﬃcient manner.
As Yang and Shea argue, sudden and signiﬁcant changes in Taiwan’s
economic environments, such as the bursting of the IT bubbles, the rise of
China’s economy, and the weakened ﬁnancial system, helped bring about
the stagnant economic condition after 1999. In Japan’s case, structural im-
pediments have also aﬀected the economy after the bursting of asset-price
bubbles.1,2 In addition, signiﬁcant structural changes to the economic en-
vironments occurred during the 1990s: for example, the changing pattern
in the division of labor between Japan and its East Asian neighbors, a rap-
idly aging population, and advances in information and communications
technology.
Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) argue that protracted economic stagnation
in Japan after the 1990s can be seen as the result of incomplete economic
adjustments to signiﬁcant changes in relative prices in two dimensions: the
intertemporal and cross-sectional dimensions. In the cross-sectional di-
mension, when relative price changes occur, frictions and distortions in
factor markets lead the economy to exhibit ineﬃcient resource allocation,
thereby lowering attainable output given the total amount of resources in
the economy. In the intertemporal dimension, as long as economic growth
remains stagnant, asset prices, which correspond to the discounted present
value of future cash ﬂow, can hardly be expected to recover, thus produc-
ing further downward pressure on trend growth through declines in capi-
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1. The list of structural impediments includes rigid corporate governance, ineﬃciency of
the nonmanufacturing sector, the issue of nonperforming assets associated with the genera-
tion and bursting of the asset-price bubble, and the savings-investment imbalance.
2. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) argue that economic stagnation in Japan in the 1990s is at-
tributable to declines in both the TFP growth rate and working hours, while Kawamoto
(2005) points out that technology growth, measured as a puriﬁed Solow residual, remains al-
most unchanged from the 1980s to the 1990s. In any case, these empirical studies suggest that
structural impediments against more eﬃcient resource allocation are crucial factors behind
Japan’s lost decade. Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003); and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap
(2003) provide further evidence that one of the major causes of Japan’s long-term stagnation
is forbearance lending to ineﬃcient ﬁrms.tal accumulation in high-productivity sectors. In addition, it should be
noted that the cross-sectional and intertemporal resource misallocation in-
teracts to amplify the negative impacts of structural factors on the econ-
omy as a whole.
Figure 10C2.1, taken from Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), depicts the re-
lationship between output growth and price changes by industry in Japan.
The horizontal and vertical axes plot annualized changes in outputs and
deﬂators by industry, respectively. Observations shown as circles and Xs,
respectively, indicate data for the period from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990
to 2001.
An overall negative relationship suggests the importance of supply-side
factors in determining cross-sectional diﬀerences over time. Resources are
allocated to growing industries where relative prices are declining, reﬂect-
ing their relatively high productivity growth. A closer look at the ﬁgure,
however, reveals that the above negative relationship varies between two
periods: thin and bold solid lines for the observations for the periods 1980–
90 and 1990–2001, respectively; and thin and bold dotted lines for the ob-
servations for the corresponding periods but excluding electrical machin-
ery. The slopes of the observations for the period of 1980–90 are negative,
regardless of inclusion or exclusion of the outlier observation for electrical
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Fig. 10C2.1 Output growth and inﬂation by industry
Source: Okina and Shiratsuka (2004).machinery, while the slope of the observations for the period 1990–2001
turns slightly positive if the outlier observation for electrical machinery is
excluded.
Increased Waiting-Option Value in Response to Political Uncertainty
The second point is that waiting-option values rise in response to in-
creased uncertainties in the economy, thereby restraining irreversible ex-
penditure to consumption and investment.
Yang and Shea document that uncertainties in both political and eco-
nomic environments have increased signiﬁcantly in the 2000s. Political con-
ﬂicts with China have intensiﬁed, as Taiwan has leaned toward establish-
ing itself as an independent nation The rise of the Chinese economy
induces foreign direct investment to China, leading to the growing con-
cerns over the hollowing out of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector.
As discussed in Saito and Shiratsuka (2003), an important element in
saving motive under uncertainty is an option to wait for the uncertainty to
be resolved. With this motive, savings are regarded as a ﬂexible choice for
the future, while consumption is treated as a ﬁrm commitment to current
expenditures or a perfectly irreversible decision. Such a waiting-option
motive becomes more important when uncertainties surrounding the
economy are growing. It should be noted, however, that a waiting-option
motive is often confused with a precautionary motive.
The aforementioned two types of saving motives under uncertainty pro-
vide broad implications. That is, the ﬁrst motive is driven by the magnitude
of risks, while the second is promoted by the subsequent resolution of un-
certainty. If saving motives as waiting options are present, savings increase
when uncertainty is expected to be resolved subsequently. Empirical re-
sults shown in Saito and Shiratsuka (2003) indicate that saving behavior
since the 1980s is more consistent with dominant precautionary savings;
however, estimation results from the behavior during the 1990s oﬀer some
evidence in favor of savings as waiting options.
Conclusions
In closing, I emphasize the importance of investigating the cause of the
problem more deeply for each episode of deﬂation. I think there are more
interesting issues on deﬂation ripe for further investigation. The nature of
deﬂation varies from country to country and from episode to episode. Re-
quired policy responses also vary according to such diﬀerences in the na-
ture of the deﬂation.
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